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Uneasy Burden: What it Really
Means to Learn to Think like a

Lawyer
by Peter R. Teachout"
If you think you can think about a thing that is hitched to other things
without thinking about the things that it is hitched to, then you have
[learned to think like a lawyer].
Thomas Reed Powell1
It imposes the uneasy burden and occasional joy of a complex double
vision, a fluid, ambivalent response to men and events which represents, at its finest, a profoundly civilized adjustment to the cost of
being human in this modern world.
Ralph Ellison2
I.
I first met Jim Elkins in the summer of 1979 when we were fellows
together in a Law and Humanities program under the direction of
Professor James White at the University of Chicago. Together with eight
other law professors from around the country, we spent six weeks
reading and discussing the great classics of Western literature: Homer's
Iliad, Thucydides' History of the Pelopennesian War, Plato's Gorgias,
Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Swift's Tale of a Tub,
Burke's Reflections, and Austen's Emma. I do not think I am speaking
* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. Amherst College (B.A., 1962); Harvard Law
School (J.D., 1965); University of Sussex, England (M.A., 1967).

1. Letter from T. Powell to R. Schuyler (Sept. 22, p. 1.). On file in Thomas Reed Powell
papers in Harvard Law School Manuscripts Division. The actual quote reads: "If you
think you can think about a thing that is hitched to other things without thinking about
the things that it is hitched to, then you have a legal mind."

2. RALPH ELLISON, SHADOW AND ACT 137 (The New American Library 1964) (1953).
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out of turn when I say that, not just for me, but for all of us, it was one
of the most profound educational experiences of our lives.
Often after our daily discussion sessions, Jim and I would go out for
a run along the shore of Lake Michigan. I remember one afternoon in
particular when we ran for miles along the lakefront. It was one of
those picture-perfect Chicago summer days: families with picnic blankets
spread out on the grass, kids flying brightly colored kites, dogs chasing
frisbees, the smell of barbecued chicken in the air, a gentle cooling
breeze blowing in off the lake, sunlight glittering on the water. In our
session that morning, we had just finished Thucydides' History and
tomorrow we were starting into Plato's Gorgias. As we were running
along, I confided to Jim that I had always had difficulty reading the
Platonic dialogues. I had never been able to understand what it was
that people found so attractive about Socrates. The Socrates who
appeared in the dialogues struck me as something of an intellectual
bully. Moreover, there was something about the quality of argument in
the dialogues that I found deeply dissatisfying. It proceeded at such a
level of abstraction that it often seemed to me to be either platitudinous
or circular. How could anyone disagree with the proposition that the
good is better than the bad?
In response, Jim told me about a book he had read that had a
profound impact on his life, a book he had come back to again and again'
in the early days of his own law teaching: Robert Pirsig's Zen and Art
of Motorcycle Maintenance.3 The book was about teaching and rhetoric
and living one's life, but it was also, he told me, about reading Plato.
The narrator of Pirsig's novel too, apparently, had been put off by Plato's
Socrates, by his ruthlessly dissecting intelligence. In part, the book was
about his coming to terms with that, about defining his own relationship
to whatever it was that Socrates represented. Sensing that Pirsig's book
might strike a responsive chord in me as well, Jim urged me to read it.

Due to the press of other readings, I did not get to Pirsig's book that
summer. Indeed, it was several years before I finally had a chance to
read it. By that time, ironically, I had come around completely in my
attitude toward the Platonic dialogues. In the intervening years, Plato
had become a teacher and a friend. The nature of that change is
something about which I will have more to say later; suffice it to say
here that by the time I got around to reading Pirsig's book, I had a

3. R. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE (William Morrow & Co.,
1974).
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completely different perspective on Plato and the dialogues than I had
when Jim first suggested the book to me on our run that summer day in
Chicago back in 1979.
Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance is, at the surface level, the
story of a motorcycle trip taken by the narrator and his eleven year old
son from their home in Minnesota to California. In the course of that
journey, the narrator reflects upon his own life, interweaving his
reflections with descriptions of the current journey. Something
happened somewhere in the past-a kind of breakdown-and he is
trying to come to terms with it. Whatever happened, it is clear that it
had its roots in something that went wrong with the culture itself a long
time ago. The "art of motorcycle maintenance" is a metaphor the
narrator develops for coming to terms with that breakdown. It is a way
of putting a world that has disintegrated back together again, of
achieving "an inner piece of mind."4
For me, the book had a special personal resonance. When I was in
law school, I owned a Triumph Bonneville 650cc. Of all the bikes I ever
owned, it was my favorite, and I rode it whenever I could. Among other
places, I rode it down across the South when I went to Louisiana to do
civil rights work in the summer of 1964. My body can still feel the
divider splits--crickety crack, crickety crack, crickety crack-in the
rolling concrete highway that runs through the red dirt hills of
Mississippi. It was a beautiful machine, and it drew people to it almost
magically whenever I stopped, providing an opener for conversations
with local inhabitants along the way which otherwise I never would have
had. That particular journey was especially memorable, but there were
other journeys, and other machines, as well. So even if there had been
nothing more to Pirsig's book, the evocative descriptions in it of
motorcycling through the Western mountains would have triggered in
me an immediate sympathetic response.
But there was more to the book. Zen and the Art of Motorcycle
Maintenance is, at bottom, a deeply serious effort by Pirsig to come to
terms with what he perceives to be the destructive fragmentation and
compartmentalization of human consciousness in the modern world. The
great enemy, as he portrays it, is western civilization itself. It is the
enemy because it superimposes upon us a set of rigid categories for
thinking about experience-dualistic categories like art versus science,
romanticism versus classicism, eastern thought versus western
thought-that radically limit our perception and understanding. The
entire thrust and pressure of western civilization, as Pirsig sees it, has

4. See id. at 73-75, 294-97.
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been to subvert and destroy what was at some earlier point in human
development a capacity for seeing and experiencing life whole. His great
effort in Art of Motorcycle Maintenance is to find a way to bust through
the limitations of those inherited categories in order to recover that
earlier consciousness.
As his story unfolds, Pirsig's unnamed narrator recalls a mysterious
figure, an apparent manifestation of his earlier self, a character named
Phaedrus, whose animistic symbol is the wolf. Phaedrus represents a
precivilized figure, a consciousness from the world before compartmentalization. Like a detective, the narrator seeks to discover what happened
to Phaedrus, following the trail back ultimately to his graduate school
days at the University of Chicago and to his experiences in a course on
the classics of Greek philosophy.
Phaedrus' teacher in the course, known to the reader only as the
anonymous "Professor of Philosophy," represents the destructive forces
of civilization. He is a master of the dialectical method (as Phaedrus
understands that method), using it to cut his students off from their
former beliefs and understandings, to isolate them and expose their
views to ridicule, to humiliate them and force them into a kind of
submission.5 The intellectual games he plays with his students seem
aimed at one thing only: to superimpose upon them, finally and
irreversibly, the destructive compartmentalizing sensibility embodied in
the classics of western civilization. Phaedrus, "the wolf," finds himself
trapped in a deadly game of survival with this ominous figure. He is
like a wild creature who is being carefully and ruthlessly stalked. The
interchanges between the two, between the Professor of Philosophy and
the wolf creature, represent a struggle between two great forces: the one
representing the entire weight and body of western civilization, the
denial of self and fullness of self, the compartmentalizing, dissecting
intelligence; the other, the resisting, still-unbroken, precivilized self, the
sensibility still capable of seeing the world whole.
The climactic moment comes when Phaedrus discovers the critical role
played by Aristotle and Plato in establishing a destructive compartmentalizing consciousness. At first, Phaedrus is certain that Aristotle must
have been responsible. In that philosopher's great tireless organizational
performances, where he happily categorizes and subcategorizes the
entire universe, Phaedrus thinks he has discovered the source of the
departmentalizing and fragmenting tendencies of mind that have

5. See id. at 361-81. When the Professor of Philosophy stops showing up for class due
to a mysterious illness, he is replaced by an equally anonymous "Chairman of the
Committee," who represents, in a somewhat different manifestation, the same destructive
civilizing forces. See id. at 382-93.
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destroyed our ability to see experience whole. Yet there is something
missing in that explanation, so he pursues the trail back even further,
to Plato.
Until now, Phaedrus has always regarded Plato as a sympathetic
figure. Unlike Aristotle, Plato's central effort, after all, was to find the
unity in things. When Phaedrus reads the Gorgias, however, he realizes
suddenly that he has been wrong. It was Plato, not Aristotle, he
discovers, who first turned civilization off on the wrong track.
The key lies in understanding the significance of Plato's attack on the
rhetoricians in the Gorgias. Who were the rhetoricians? Phaedrus wants
to know. And what did they stand for?
The rhetoricians of ancient Greece were the first teachers in the
history of the Western world. Plato vilified them in all his works to
grind an axe of his own and since what we know about them is almost
entirely from Plato they're unique in that they've stood condemned
throughout history without ever having their side of the story told.6
What was it about the rhetoricians, or Sophists, as they were called, that
made Plato feel a need to vilify them? What was it that they taught
that he so feared or resented?
What they taught, Phaedrus discovers, was that all truths are
"relative"--relative, that is, to particular human experience:
They were teachers, but what they sought to teach was not principles,
but beliefs of men. Their object was not any single absolute truth, but
the improvement of men. All principles, all truths, are relative, they
said. "Man is the measure of all things." These were the famous
teachers of "wisdom," the Sophists of ancient Greece.'
Plato attacks the Sophists, then, because their relativistic view of the
world threatened the successful establishment of the emerging and still
fragile idea that there is a single absolute Truth,8 and a single absolute
Good. The Sophists's relativistic teachings threatened, in short, the
establishment of the Platonic idea of "virtue": "Virtue, if it implies
anything at all, implies an ethical absolute. A person whose idea of
what is proper varies from day to day can be admired for his broadmindedness, but not for his virtue. Not, at least, as Phaedrus understands
the word."9 But, if not virtue, what was it that the Sophists held out as
the highest goal of human striving? What was it that they sought to

6. Id. at 172.
7. "Id. at 373.
8. Id. at 373-74.
9. Id. at 374-75 (emphasis added).
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embody in their own performances? What was it, in short, that Plato
had to destroy in order to establish his notion of virtue as an absolute
Good?
After intense searching, Phaedrus discovers the answer finally in
Kitto's The Greeks, in the discussion there of the Greek concept of arete:
"What moves the Greek warrior to deeds of heroism," he reads in Kitto,
"is not a sense of duty as we understand it-duty towards others; it is
rather duty towards himself. He strives after that which we translate
'virtue' but is in Greek arete, 'excellence'. . . we shall have much to say
about arete. It runs through Greek life." 0 But, what exactly is arete?
What does it mean? Phaedrus returns to Kitto:
When we meet arete in Plato ....

we translate it "virtue" and conse-

quently miss all the flavour of it. "Virtue," at least in modem English,
is almost entirely a moral word; arete, on the other hand, is used
indifferently in all the categories, and simply means excellence.
Thus the hero of the Odyssey is a great fighter, a wily schemer, a ready
speaker, a man of stout heart and broad wisdom who knows that he
must endure without too much complaining what the gods send; and
he can both build and sail a boat, drive a furrow as straight as anyone,
beat a young braggart at throwing the discus, challenge the Phaeacian
youth at boxing, wrestling or running; flay, skin, cut up and cook an
ox, and be moved to tears by a song. He is in fact an excellent allrounder; he has surpassing arete."
Then he finds the key: "Arete implies a respect for the wholeness or
oneness of life, and a consequent dislike of specialization. It implies a
contempt for efficiency-or rather a much higher idea of efficiency, an
efficiency -which exists not in one department of life but in life itself."
"Arete implies a respect for the wholeness or oneness of life .... "1 2 Here
at last was the answer Phaedrus has been looking for. This is what the
Sophists represented that Plato felt a need to destroy. They represented
a respect for the wholeness or oneness of life and the concomitant
rejection of specialization of thought and understanding.
Against the Sophists' embrace of the wholeness or oneness of life,
Plato deployed the full force of his dialectic. The dialectical question and
answer method was perfectly suited to the task, moreover, because by its
very nature it served to break down wholeness of understanding and
response. It served to break down and isolate and expose to ridicule' 3-and by doing so directly contributed to fragmentation of

10. Id. at 376 (quoting from Krrro s, THE GREEKS).
11. Id. at 377 (quoting from KTTO'S, THE GREEKS).
12. Id. (quoting from Krrro's, THE GREEKS).
13. Id. at 391.
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consciousness. That is why Aristotle too embraced dialectic, Phaedrus
realizes, and why he claimed that "dialectic comes before everything
else." 4
Phaedrus now sees it all clearly. This is where it all began: with
Plato's attacks on the rhetoricians in the Gorgias,and with his assertion
there of the superiority of dialectic over rhetoric.
There is more to Pirsig's argument than I have covered here, but this,
in a nutshell, is the vision that lies at the heart of Zen and the Art of
Motorcycle Maintenance. At its core are three fundamental interlocking
beliefs: first, that the rise of western civilization has brought about the
destructive fragmentation of human consciousness; second, that Aristotle
and Plato are primarily responsible for this development; and third, that
the chief weapon employed by these two, and by their disciples, in
destroying our capacity for responding to the wholeness of life was, and
has continued to be, "the Socratic method."

One does not have to be a greatly perceptive reader to be able to
discern the traces of Pirsig's influence in the paper that Jim Elkins has
submitted here. In the first place, notice that Elkins' central preoccupation in this paper is the same as Pirsig's in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle
Maintenance. In both cases, the core problem is the destructive
compartmentalization and fragmentation of human consciousness. The
difference is that in Elkins' paper the focus has shifted to the way a
legal education-to the way "learning to think like a lawyer"-can
our capacity to see and respond to experience as whole perdestroy
15
sons.
Second, Elkins' paradigmatic law teacher-his fictitiously-named
"Professor Lawson"-goes to work on his law students in much the same
way that, in Pirsig's Zen, the ominous Professor of Philosophy goes to
work on his graduate students. Both are portrayed as representatives
of the ruthlessly dissecting intelligence. Like Pirsig's Professor of
Philosophy, Elkins' Professor Lawson seems to regard his primary
mission in life as that of separating his students from their former, as
it were, their "amateur," selves.16 Everything he says and does seems
aimed at forcing a radical separation of their professional from their
personal responses to experience.

14. Id, at 390 (quoting Aristotle) (emphasis in original deleted).
15. See James R. Elkins, Thinking Like a Lawyer: Second Thoughts 47 MERCER L. REV.
511, 536-38 (1996).

16. See discussion in Elkins, supra note 15, at 517-18.
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Third, Elkins' law students regard their legal education in terms that
are strikingly similar to those in which Pirsig's narrator regarded his
graduate education in philosophy at the University of Chicago. For both,
education is, at bottom, a pathological, self-denying, soul-destroying
process. To be educated, at least in the graduate school context, means
to undergo a process of dialectical inquisition, the chief aim of which is
to disable one permanently from ever again responding to experience as
a human being. 7
Finally, following Pirsig, Elkins is deeply critical of the so-called
"Socratic method" (at least as he sees it being employed in the law school
context)." Like Pirsig, he regards the Socratic method as a weapon of
dissection and fragmentation. It is not just that it makes students feel
uncomfortable, it is that it is used-Pirsig would say, consciously-to
break down the student's integrity of self. The fact that the Socratic
method is the primary pedagogical method used in law school is further
evidence of legal education's destructive potential.
To Elkins, in short, legal education represents a particularly acute and
pernicious manifestation of what education in western cultural traditions
represents more generally to Pirsig. Elkins' paper on the hazards of
learning to think like a lawyer can be seen, in this sense, as an effort to
apply to legal education the basic teachings and insights of Zen and the
Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.

Reduced to its essence, Elkins' indictment of traditional legal
education rests upon two core, Pirsig-inspired, claims. First, that legal
education is morally incapacitating because it teaches us to keep
radically separate that which is moral from that which is legal and,
furthermore, to be concerned only with that which is legal. Second, that
legal education is destructive of the self because it teaches us to deny
every aspect of our response to experience except that which is purely
and technically legal. Learning to think like a lawyer, under this view,
is doubly disabling: not only does it prevent us from seeing and dealing
intelligently with moral issues, it renders us incapable of responding to
experience as human beings. But are these claims valid? Are these in
fact the necessary consequences of "learning to think like a lawyer"? Is
Elkins' indictment, in short, a fair one?

17.

See discussion in Elkins, supra note 15, at 526-28.

18. See, e.g., Elkins, supra note 15, at 524, 526. Professor Elkins draws a distinction,
however, between what is practiced in law schools today and what Socrates himself

performed and espoused. Id. at 524.
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My own view, which I elaborate below, is that, carried along by
Pirsig's influence, Elkins ends up getting things exactly backwards. I
know that there are radical positivists who insist that law ought to be
kept entirely separate from morality, and I also know that there are bad
law teachers-there are "Professor Lawsons" out there-and to that
extent Elkins has a point. But the mainstream tradition of legal
education in this country, it seems to me, has always emphasized the
key role played by morality in the development and understanding of the
law; it has always taught that we proceed at our hazard if we ignore the
close and intimate interrelationship between the two. Indeed, I would
go beyond mere rebuttal. Not only is a legal education not morally
incapacitating as Elkins claims; if anything, I would argue, it offers
those who take it seriously a more complex understanding of the moral
dimensions of experience.
Turning to Elkins' second complaint, his concern with the general
dehumanizing impact of an education in the law, my response is much
the same. I recognize that making connections between what we know
specially as lawyers and everything else we know is not always easy,
indeed, that to do it right often requires a certain art; and I also
recognize that there will always be some students and practitioners who
are not very good at it. I disagree strongly, however, with Elkins' claim
that learning to think like a lawyer somehow requires us to deny
important aspects of the self, or to forego self-expression, or otherwise
to abandon our basic humanity. A legal education may discourage "fuzzy
thinking," it may come down hard on sentimentalism in all its various
other forms, but it does not do the things that Elkins charges it with.
Indeed, I would argue that, here again, for those who are willing to take
it seriously, an education in the law opens up a whole new range of
possibilities for self-expression and self-realization.
In this Article, I propose putting these claims to the test by examining
actual examples of the legal mind at work. What better way to
understand what it means to learn to think like a lawyer than to watch
the legally trained sensibility in actual performance? The first example
is Justice Robert Jackson's opening statement as Chief United States
Prosecutor at Nuremburg. 9 I have chosen Jackson's statement because
I cannot think of a better example of a performance inspired by the
traditions of the common law. The second example is an examination
question-the famous "injured motorcyclist" question-from the Legal
Process course at Harvard Law School.2" I do not think anybody would
contest that the Legal Process school reflects the mainstream tradition
19. See infra text accompanying notes 21-35.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 40-52.
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of legal education in this country. The first of these examples, it will be
noted, is drawn from the "real world" of practice; the second, from the
world of legal education. If these do not reflect what it means to think
like a lawyer, it is difficult to imagine what would.
For purposes of making the points I wish to make I could have chosen
selections from more recent legal writings, but I deliberately decided
against doing so because I wanted to avoid having to deal with the
complicating claim that whatever morality or other humanizing
influence has crept into legal education has done so only as the result of
recent enlightened reforms. I chose the examples I did precisely because
they are such classic performances of the traditional understanding of
what it means to think like a lawyer.
As we examine these performances, we should ask of them directly
and critically the questions that Elkins raises in his paper: Here is a
legal mind in performance. Do we see evidence of the radical separation
of law and morality? Do we see a narrow "legalistic" mind at work? Do
we see a denial of self? If we do find evidence of these sorts of pathological pressures at work, then maybe Elkins is right. But if those
pressures are not reflected, that raises serious questions, it seems to me,
about the basic validity of his thesis. Maybe the problem is not learning
to think like a lawyer after all; maybe it is something else. But if so,
then what is that "something else"? And what does learning to think
like a lawyer really mean?
II.

When Justice Jackson was first asked to serve as Chief United States
Prosecutor at Nuremberg, he had to deal with two threshold problems
the resolution of which would vitally effect the course of subsequent
proceedings.2 The first was whether there ought to be a trial in the
first place-what might be called the due process problem. The second
was whether waging an aggressive war ought to be considered a crime
at international law. As Jackson set about framing his approach to
these problems, his training as a lawyer played a deeply influential role.
With respect to the first question, Jackson concluded that there ought
to be a trial and, furthermore, that the defendants ought to be provided
with counsel and with all available means to defend themselves. He
responded as he did in large part because he brought to the question a
sensibility forged in the due process traditions of Anglo-American
jurisprudence. With respect to the second question, Jackson concluded

21. For an excellent brief description of Jackson's performance at Nuremberg, see
Telford Taylor, The Nuremberg Trials, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 488 (1955).
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that waging an aggressive war should be considered a crime at
international law. In arriving at this view, and in subsequently
successfully advocating its adoption, Jackson turned again to his legal
education, finding inspiration and support in this instance in the
fundamental traditions of the common law. In both instances, Jackson
would not have responded as he did if he had not learned to think like
a lawyer. His Nuremburg performance offers a nice measure in this
sense of what learning to think like a lawyer really means.

After the end of World War II, there was considerable sentiment, both
in this country and abroad, in favor of summary execution of the
defeated Nazi leaders. Those who favored this "political" disposition
argued that a judicial trial would serve no legitimate purpose. What the
Nazis leaders had done was so obviously and so hideously culpable that
it was inconceivable that they should escape punishment. Since the
outcome of a trial was a foregone conclusion, and since a trial with a
predetermined outcome would be a travesty of justice, the Nazi
leadership should be executed without trial by virtue of a political
decision.'
Jackson strongly objected to this proposal, arguing that the Nazi
leaders should be afforded a trial at which they would be given full, fair
opportunity to defend themselves consistent with basic notions of due
process. They should have the benefit of the presumption of innocence;
they should be provided with assistance of counsel; and they should be
given full opportunity to present their defense. Although Jackson
ultimately prevailed, there was still considerable skepticism about the
value of holding a trial. One of the first challenges he faced in his
opening statement, then, was explaining to the world why providing
these defendants with a fair trial was important.
In reading the following excerpts from Jackson's opening statement,
the thing to pay attention to, for our purposes, is not so much the
substantive argument he makes, although that is not irrelevant, as the
"quality of mind" that is reflected. Notice how effectively and forcefully
Jackson interweaves the language of morality and the language of law.
He achieves here what might be called the full expression of the
ethically integrated sensibility. He does so, moreover, as we shall see,
not despite, but in large part because of, his legal education and
training. Jackson's performance represents in this respect, I would

22. The Nuremberg Trials, supra note 21, at 511.
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argue, a clear refutation of Elkins' view of the destructive consequences
of a legal education.
Jackson began as follows:
The privilege of opening the first trial in history for crimes against
the peace of the world imposes a grave responsibility. The wrongs,
which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so
malignant, and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their
being ignored, because it cannot survive their being repeated. That
four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the
hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the
judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that Power
has ever paid to Reason.23
Jackson then turned to describe the defendants and the "wrongs" they
had done:
. In the prisoners' dock sit twenty-odd broken men. Reproached by
the humiliation of those they have led almost as bitterly as by the
desolation of those they have attacked, their personal capacity for evil
is forever past ....

Merely as individuals their fate is of little

consequence to the world.
What makes this inquest significant is that these prisoners represent
sinister influences that will lurk in the world long after their bodies
have returned to dust. [They are] living symbols of racial hatreds, of
terrorism and violence, and of the arrogance and cruelty of power.
They are symbols of fierce nationalisms and of militarism, of intrigue
and war-making which have embroiled Europe generation after
generation, crushing its manhood, destroying its homes, and impoverishing its life. They have so identified themselves with the philosophies they conceived and with the forces they directed that any
tenderness to them is a victory and an encouragement to all the evils
which are attached to their names. Civilization can afford no
compromise with the social forces which would gain renewed strength
if we deal ambiguously or indecisively with the men in whom those
forces now precariously survive.24
Yet, no matter how heinous their conduct, the defendants should still be
given a fair trial:
The former high station of these defendants, the notoriety of their
acts, and the adaptability of their conduct to provoke retaliation make
it hard to distinguish between the demand for a just and measured
retribution, and the unthinking cry for vengeance which arises from

23.

TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY

TRIBUNAL 98-99 (1947) [hereinafter TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
24. Id. at 99.

CRIMINALS].
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the anguish of war. It is our task, so far as humanly possible, to draw
the line between the two. We must never forget that the record on
which we judge these defendants today is the record on which history
will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice
is to put it to our own lips as well. We must summon such detachment
and intellectual integrity to our task that this Trial will commend itself
to posterity as fulfilling humanity's aspirations to do justice ....
These defendants may be hard pressed but they are not ill-used ....
If these men are the first war leaders of a defeated nation to be
prosecuted in the name of the law, they are also the first to be given
a chance to plead for their lives in the name of the law. Realistically,
the Charter of this Tribunal, which gives them a hearing, is also the
source of their only hope. It may be that these men of troubled
conscience, whose only wish is that the world forget them, do not
regard a trial as a favor. But they do have a fair opportunity to defend
themselves--a favor which these men, when in power, rarely extended
to their fellow countrymen. Despite the fact that public opinion
already condemns their acts, we agree that here they must be given a
presumption of innocence, and we accept the burden of proving
criminal acts and the responsibility of these defendants for their
commission.'
Jackson next addressed the defendants' contention that it was unfair
to charge them with the crime of waging an aggressive war since at the
time they acted that particular offense had not been clearly defined as
a crime in positive international legislation. In responding to this
contention, Jackson turned for inspiration and support to the common
law. To adopt defendants' position, he argued, would be to leave
international law "helpless" to deal with this and similar situations. But
it did not have to be so paralyzed. "International law," he observed:
is not capable of development by the normal process of legislation, for
there is no continuing international legislative authority. It grows, as
did the common law, through decisions reached from time to time in
adopting settled principles to new situations. The fact is that when the
law evolves by the case method, as did the common law and as
international law must do if it is to advance at all, it advances at the
expense of those who wrongly guessed the law and learned too late
their error. The law, so far as international law can be decreed, has
been clearly pronounced when these acts took place.26

25. 1d at 101-02.
26.

Id. at 147.
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The common law had evolved through the application of underlying
principles to new situations. International law should develop in that
same way. The civilized world had already recognized in various
treaties and other documents the notion that waging an aggressive war
was no longer considered acceptable behavior by the international
community. The principles underlying those treaties and other
documents already existed. All that remained was to apply them, in the
manner of the common law, to the actions of the defendants.
Nothing less was at stake, Jackson observed, than "civilization" itself:
The real complaining party at your bar is Civilization. In all our
countries it is still a struggling and imperfect thing. It does not plead
that the United States, or any other country, has been blameless of the
conditions which made the German people easy victims to the blandishments and intimidations of the Nazi conspirators.
But it points to the dreadful sequence of aggressions and crimes I
have recited, it points to the weariness of flesh, the exhaustion of
resources, and the destructions of all that was beautiful or useful in so
much of the world, and to greater potentialities for destruction in the
days to come. It is not necessary among the ruins of this ancient and
beautiful city, with untold members of its civilian inhabitants still
buried in its rubble, to argue the proposition that to start or wage an
aggressive war has the moral qualities of the worst of crimes. The
refuge of the defendants can be only their hope that international law
will lag so far behind the moral sense of mankind that conduct which
is a crime in the moral sense must be regarded as innocent at law.
Civilization asks whether law is so laggard as to be utterly helpless
to deal with crimes of this magnitude by criminals of this order of
importance. It does not expect that you can make war impossible. It
does expect that your judicial action will put the forces of international
law, its precepts, its prohibitions, and most of all its sanctions, on the
side of peace, so that men and women of good will, in all countries, may
have "leave to live by no man's leave, underneath the law."'
Jackson's performance at Nuremberg, it seems to me, offers a powerful
rebuttal of Elkins' claims about the destructive consequences of learning
to think like a lawyer. Elkins claims that learning to think like a
lawyer means learning to keep radically separate law and morality. But
Jackson clearly had learned to think like a lawyer and there is no
evidence of that kind of radical separation here. Indeed, just the
opposite, his indictment of the defendants turns upon an appreciation of
the close and intimate relationship that exists between law and morality.
It is true that the morality Jackson asserts is not his own personal

27. Id. at 155.
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morality but rather the morality of the civilized world, but it is a deep,
substantive morality nonetheless.
"[To start or wage an aggressive war," Jackson insists at one point in
telling language, "has the moral qualities of the worst of crimes."' At
another point, he argues in a similar vein that it would be wrong under
these circumstances to treat "conduct which is a crime in the moral
sense" as "innocent in law." 9 Throughout his opening statement,
considerations of law and morality are so inextricably intertwined that
if one were to try to separate out the morally relevant from the legally
relevant statements, the entire performance would be rendered
meaningless. It is not just that connections of some sort can be made
between law and morality. In the world that Jackson describes here,
law is the embodiment in enforceable legal standards of "the moral sense
of mankind."
Jackson's performance also challenges the popular notion that learning
to think like a lawyer means learning to think and speak in "narrow
legalistic terms." Listen to this voice:
In the prisoner's dock sit twenty-odd broken men. Reproached by the
humiliation of those they have led almost as bitterly as by the
desolation of those they have attacked, their personal capacity for evil
is forever past ....

Merely as individuals their fate is of little

consequence to the world.
What makes this inquest significant is that these prisoners represent
sinister influences that will lurk in the world long after their bodies
have returned to dust ....
The real complaining party at your bar is Civilization .... It does
not plead that the United States, or any other country, has been
blameless ....
But it points to the dreadful sequence of aggressions and crimes I
have recited, it points to the weariness of flesh, the exhaustion of
resources, and the destructions of all that was beautiful or useful in so
much of the world ....

It is not necessary among the ruins of this

ancient and beautiful city with untold members of its civilian inhabitants still buried in its rubble, to argue the proposition that to start or
wage an aggressive war has the moral qualities of the worst of
crimes.3
To be able to see in the prisoner's dock "twenty-odd broken men," to
speak of the "sinister influences" they represent, influences that will
"lurk in the world long after their bodies have returned to dust," to

28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 99, 155.
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summon up the "dreadful" consequences of what they have done, not just
the terrible human crimes, but "the weariness of flesh, the exhaustion
of resources, and the destructions of all that was beautiful or useful..."
-to think and talk this way, it seems to me, is to think and talk as a
whole person. It is to address others as whole persons as well.
Whatever else Jackson may have learned in learning to think like a
lawyer, he clearly has not learned to think in narrow legalistic terms.
Whatever he may have given up, he has not given up his capacity for
responding to experience as a human being-indeed, for responding to
it in a deeply poetic way.
It is true that learning to think like a lawyer does require a kind of
denial of the self. Jackson is quite explicit about that here: The
horrendous things that the defendants have done, he admits, "make it
hard to distinguish between the demand for a just and measured
retribution, and the unthinking cry for vengeance which arises from the
anguish of war."3 Nonetheless, it is something that we must strive to
do. "We must summon such detachment and intellectual integrity to our
task that this trial will commend itself to posterity as fulflling
humanity's aspirations to do justice." 2 Like Pirsig's Phaedrus, Jackson
recognizes that there is a difference between the spontaneous human
response and the response called for by the civilized traditions of our
culture. Unlike Phaedrus, however, Jackson comes down in favor of the
civilized response. The deeply felt personal response-the "unthinking
cry for vengeance which arises from the anguish of war"--ought to be
repressed in this instance, he argues, in favor of the "detached" response.
It ought to be repressed, not out of sympathy for the defendants, but
because our sense of who we are as a people depends upon it. If we were
to vent our anguish by summarily executing these defendants, it might
satisfy our immediate personal feelings, but it would ultimately come
back to haunt us. "To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put
it to our own lips as well."33
In the world of Jackson's opening statement, there is no radical
separation of law and morality. There is no loss of capacity for human
response. There is no denial of the self-except for those primitive
aspects that ought to be denied. The legally trained sensibility we see
reflected here is clearly capable of responding to experience in a fully
integrated way. If Jackson's performance at Nuremberg were an
anomaly in this respect, if it were the sort of performance that most
lawyers and law professors would regard with surprise and dismay, it

31. Id. at 101.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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would be one thing. But it clearly is not. Most lawyers and law
professors would hold it up, I think, as I do here, as an example of the
legal mind at its best.
But it is not just that learning to think like a lawyer does not have the
negative consequences that Elkins claims it does; it is that it can
actually serve to expand the range of our moral understanding. It
potentially offers a more complex appreciation of the moral dimensions
of experience. That expansion of moral understanding is reflected in
Jackson's opening statement in two primary ways. First of all, it is
reflected in his insistence upon the importance of due process. When
Jackson argues that the defendants ought to be given a fair trial, he is
speaking, it is important to see, not in some amateur capacity, but as
one who has been trained to think like a lawyer. The sensibility to
which he is giving expression has been forged, as it were, in the AngloAmerican traditions of due process. It is a deeply moral sensibility. We
should provide these defendants with a fair trial, Jackson argues, not
because as individuals they are specially deserving, but because the
morality of due process requires it. "Despite the fact that public opinion
already condemns their acts, we agree that here. they must be given a
presumption of innocence, and we accept the burden of proving criminal
34
acts and the responsibility of these defendants for their commission."
We do so because we want this trial to "commend itself to posterity as
fulfilling humanity's aspirations to do justice."35 Doing justice means
more than just arriving at the right result, it means providing fair
process. When we do things the right way, as Fuller once observed, we
are more likely to do the right thing.3 It is one of the first lessons that
a lawyer learns.
The second respect in which it can be said that Jackson's moral
understanding is enhanced by his legal training is reflected in his
recognition of the moral underpinnings of the common law. Law has
always grown, Jackson insists, through the progressive incorporation of
the "moral sense" of the community, and that is the way international
law should grow too. This entire section of Jackson's argument-crucial
to his argument that waging aggressive war ought to be considered a
crime at international law-is carried, as it were, by his understanding
of the common law. Here, once again, law and morality intersect in a
vital and important way.

34.
35.
36.
thing."

Id. at 102.
Id. at 101.
"If men are compelled to act in the right way, they will generally do the right
Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law, 71 HARv. L. REV. 630 (1958).
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In these two crucial respects, then-in the insistence upon the
morality of due process, and the recognition of the moral foundations of
the common law--Jackson's opening statement at Nuremberg demonstrates that learning to think like a lawyer not only is not morally
incapacitating but, just the opposite, offers those who take it seriously
a more complex understanding of the moral dimensions of experience.

In talking this way about Jackson's opening statement, I do not want
to minimize in any way the art that went into its composition. It is a
masterful performance from any standpoint. Indeed, I would hold it up
as an example in the modern legal context of what the ancient Greeks
called arete. But it is an example of arete not as the Sophists understood
that term (and as Pirsig would seek to resurrect it)-a performance of
technical excellence-but, rather as Plato redefines the term in the
Gorgias-aperformance of excellence in pursuit of virtue.
This point needs explaining: One of the problems with Zen and the
Art ofMotorcycle Maintenance is that Pirsig does not understand finally
what Plato is up to in the Gorgias. He makes the whole book turn on
his narrator's reading of that dialogue, but then his narrator fails to get
it right. He claims that Plato seeks in the Gorgias to replace the
inherited Greek notion of arete with his idea of "virtue."3 7 But that is
not what Plato seeks to do at all. His entire effort, rather, is to redefine
the meaning of the term arete so that henceforth what it means "to be
excellent" at something is "to be excellent in the pursuit of that which
is just or good."" The reason Plato undertakes this effort is that the
inherited Greek language of his day was one in which terms of
excellence were totally divorced from terms of virtue. Thus, working
with that language, the Sophists could maintain that to be a good
rhetorician-to achieve arete as a rhetorician-one did not have to know
anything about justice. All one had to know was how to persuade one's
audience, through manipulation of the techniques of rhetoric, to adopt
whatever position would serve the interests of one's client. Plato's great
effort in the Gorgias was to change that way of thinking and talking
about excellence and about human activity more generally. It was to
transform the inherited language into an ethically integrated language
so that when one talked about being good at argument, or at anything
else, one meant being good at it in the pursuit of virtue. It is in that

37. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
38. See James B. White, Plato's Gorgiasand the Modern Lawyer, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
849 (1983).
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newly reconstituted, ethically integrated, language that Plato has
Socrates speak when toward the end of the dialogue he sums up where
he and his interlocutors have come in the course of their inquiry:
[Almong so many arguments (logos), when the others are being refuted,
only this argument is stable-that we must avoid doing justice more
than suffering it, and above all a man must practice, not seeming good,
but being good, in private and public life; if someone becomes evil in
some way, he is to be punished, and this is the second good after being
just-to become just and pay justice in being punished. All flattery, to
ourselves or to others, few or many, we must shun; this is how we
should use rhetoric--always in the direction ofjustice-and every other
activity.39
Notice that there is no attempt here to replace rhetoric with dialectic, or
to discount rhetoric in any other way, as Pirsig would have us believe.
The effort, rather, is simply to ensure that when rhetoric is employed,
it is employed "always in the direction of justice." Arete has not been
replaced with virtue; the term simply has taken on ethical meaning.
It is in that reconstituted sense of the term, in any event, that I would
hold up Jackson's performance as an example of arete here. I cannot
think of a better example of an instance where excellence in a legal
performance means excellence in the pursuit of justice.

The only complication with using Jackson this way is that, as it turns
out, Jackson never went to law school. He acquired his legal education
the old fashioned way, by "reading law" in a law office. So while he
clearly did learn to think like a lawyer, he did not do so in the law
school context. But should that make a difference? Is there something
especially corruptive about the law school experience? Is the basic view
of law that is taught in law school different from that expressed by
Jackson at Nuremberg? Do law school exams somehow skew the
perspective?
III.

The best way to answer these questions is to take an actual examination from a law school course-a traditionallaw school course-and see
what sort of understanding is reflected there. We should ask of the
exam question the same sorts of questions we asked before: What view

39. PLATO, GORAS 106 (Terrence Irwin trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1979) (emphasis
supplied).
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is reflected here of the relationship between law and morality? Is it
even a concern? If so, what are students supposed to think about that
relationship? That law and morality should be kept radically separate?
Or that the two are inextricably intertwined? What view, ultimately,
are students supposed to bring away from their legal education? Are
they supposed to come away with the sort of view that is expressed by
Elkins' "Professor Lawson"? Or with a view closer to that expressed by
Jackson in his opening statement at Nuremberg?
For purposes of this essay, I have chosen an examination question
from the Legal Process course at Harvard Law School: the famous
"injured motorcyclist" question first given in the mid-sixties.40 I have
chosen this question because it represents, I think, to the extent any
particular law school examination can be said to represent, the
traditional law school view. By generations of law students, not just at
Harvard, but elsewhere, the Legal Process course, based on materials
prepared by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, has been considered the
capstone of a law school education. 4' It has been the course that pulls
it all together. So careful scrutiny of a final examination question from
that course should yield a fairly reliable clue as to what learning to
think like a lawyer means in the traditional law school context.
The central issue raised by the injured motorcyclist question is
whether the so-called "duty of rescue" doctrine should be adopted in a
particular jurisdiction. More particularly, it is whether such a doctrine
should be adopted by the courts as opposed to the legislature-and, if so,
on what terms. To answer that question, the student is required to draw
on everything he or she has learned: about the nature of the common

40. Question II, Final Exam in Legal Process, Professor Albert Sacks, Law School of
Harvard University, Examinations for 1967-68, at 37-39 [hereinafter Legal Process Exam].
To the extent I have been able to determine, this examination question was given at least
four times in the Legal Process course at Harvard Law School: by Professor Sacks in 196465; again by Professor Sacks (with initials replacing names) in 1967-68; a third time by
Professor Sacks in 1972-73; and a fourth time by visiting Professor Norman Dorsen in
1983-84. The complete question, as it appeared in the 1967-68 exam, is set out infra in

Appendix A.
For purposes of discussion in this article, I have used the names, instead of initials, as
they appeared in 1964-65 exam. Citation references, however, are to the 1967-68 exam
because it was the only exam available at this time.
41.

HENRY M. HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (Foundation Press 1994).

From 1958 to 1994, the Legal Process materials were available only in a multilith
"tentative edition" dated 1958. In 1994, the original 1958 materials were published in
hardback by Foundation Press. For a description of the history of the Legal Process course
at Harvard and the use of the Hart and Sacks materials, see the introductory essay by
Eskridge and Frickey, "An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process," in
H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process, at li-cxxxvi.
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law; about the relationship of law to morality; about the way the law
evolves over time; about reasoning by analogy; about the relative
capacities and limitations of courts and legislatures-in short, about a
whole range of things that one learns in the course of a law school
education. In reading the question and speculating about what might
be considered an acceptable answer, it is interesting to ask, then, what
view is implicit about what it means to learn to think like a lawyer.
The question begins with Drake, a specialist in brain surgery,
accompanying Tortson, a Torts professor, to a public meeting at which
Tortson gives a lecture entitled "Some Public Misconceptions about
Law."42 In the course of the lecture, Tortson invokes the traditional
refusal of the courts to impose "an affirmative obligation to aid a
stranger in distress' in support of his general thesis that law and
morality are separate things and ought to be kept so. On this larger
theme, Tortson had the following to say:
With the humane side of the question courts are not concerned. It
is the omission or negligent discharge of legal duties only which comes
within the sphere of legal cognizance. For withholding relief from the
suffering, for failure to respond to the calls of worthy charity, or for
faltering in the bestowment of brotherly love on the unfortunate,
penalties are found not in the laws of men but in that higher law, the
violation of which is condemned by the voice of conscience, whose
sentence of punishment for the recreant act is swift and sure."
Walking back together after the meeting, Doctor Drake and Professor
Tortson witness an accident in which a motorcyclist skids on an ice
patch and collides with a tree. They find the motorcycle driver, Jones,
"lying unconscious on the side of the road, bleeding profusely from a
deep gash in his thigh."4 5 Professor Tortson urges the doctor to "do
something to stop the bleeding," but Drake replies that he does not wish
"to get involved."'5 Thereupon Tortson "immediately telephone[s] the
police from a nearby public phone and request[s] that an ambulance be
sent."47 Unfortunately, because of inclement weather, the ambulance
takes a half an hour to arrive. Jones consequently dies on the way to
the hospital because of "loss of blood.'

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Legal Process Exam, supra note 40, at 37.
Id.
Id. at 37-38.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The administrator of Jones' estate subsequently files a wrongful death
action against Doctor Drake in an Ames state court, alleging that "Drake
was under a legal duty as a doctor to provide emergency care, and that
if Drake had fashioned and applied a tourniquet to Jones' wound, as he
easily could have, the bleeding would have been checked and Jones
would have survived."49 The trial court dismisses the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action. Jones' administrator appeals to the
Supreme Court of Ames.
The student is asked to discuss how this appeal should be decided. As
an aid to analysis, the student is provided with the following background
material:
Lawyers for the litigants have presented the following materials:
(1)Numerous decisions of the state supreme court in accord with the
assertion of the Torts professor that there is no duty to come to the aid
of a stranger. In a recent application of this principle, the Court
absolved an expert swimmer of any liability by reason of his failure to
attempt the rescue of a drowning child.
(2) Decisions to the effect that one who undertakes, whether by
request or officiously, to assist a person in peril must act with reasonable care and prudence and cannot abandon his efforts if to do so would
expose the injured or endangered person to further risk of harm.
(3) Decisions allowing recovery in quantum meruit for necessary
medical services furnished in an emergency, even where the patient did
not specifically request or agree to pay for the services.
(4) A so-called "Good Samaritan" statute of a common type, enacted
by the state legislature in 1966, which provides:
A physician or registered nurse who in good faith renders
emergency care at the scene of an emergency where a physicianpatient or registered nurse-patient relationship did not exist prior
to the advent of such emergency, shall not be liable for any civil
damages as a result of acts or omissions by the physicians or
registered nurse in rendering the emergency care, except acts or
omissions amounting to gross negligence or willful and wanton
misconduct.
(5) A provision in the Principles of Medical Ethics promulgated by
the American Medical Association (a voluntary professional organization, membership in which is not a prerequisite for the practice of
medicine):
A physician is free to choose whom he will serve. He should,
however, respond to any request for his assistance in an emergency or whenever temperate public opinion expects the service.
(6) A penal provision in the state's Motor Vehicle Code which
requires the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident to "render to

49. Id.
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any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance in securing
medical aid or transportation,'
After having reviewed this background material, the student is asked to
"[sitate what the decision of the Supreme Court of Ames should be,
convassing all issues. " "
The injured motorcyclist question is an extremely rich question, the
various elements of which cover the entire range of issues to which the
student has been exposed in the Legal Process course. It would be
impossible even to begin to do justice to the full range of issues here.
Rather than attempt that, I want to concentrate on just those issues that
have particular bearing on the concerns that Elkins raises in his paper.
The central issue for our purposes is the one raised directly by Tortson's
lecture: What is the correct view of the relationship between law and
morality? Is Tortson right when he asserts that "[With the humane side
of the question courts are not concerned."'
The first thing to notice is that this is an issue. The student is clearly
supposed to have developed a view on the matter. This would seem to
undercut Ellins' claim that the relationship between law and morality
is not a traditional law school concern. But what view is the student
supposed to have of this relationship? Is the student supposed to agree
with Tortson? For anyone who has worked through the Legal Process
materials, the answer would be readily apparent-and the answer is no.
The Legal Process materials, it turns out, proceed on the same
understanding of the relationship of law and morality that Jackson
expresses in his opening statement at Nuremberg. The chief difference
is that, because the Legal Process treatment of this question is more
extensive, the understanding developed there is more nuanced and
refined. The core vision, however, is the same.
The starting point for analysis is understanding the nature of the
common law. The view of the common law embraced by the Legal
Process materials is the classic nineteenth century view as expressed by
Supreme Court in his famous
Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts
63
description in the Norwood Plains case:
It is one of the great merits and advantages of the common law, that,
instead of a series of detailed practical rules, established by positive
provisions, and adapted to the precise circumstances of particular

50. Id. at 38-39.
51. Id. at 39.
52. Id. at 37.
53. Norwood Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine R.R., 1 Gray 263 (Mass. 1854) (discussed

in HART & SACKS, supra note 41, at 362-83).
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cases, which would become obsolete and fail, when the practice and
course of business, to which they apply, should cease or change, the
common law consists of a few broad and comprehensive principles
founded on reason, natural justice, and enlightened public policy,
modified and adapted to the circumstances of all the particular cases
which fall within it. These general principles of equity and policy are
rendered precise, specific, and adapted to practical use, by usage, which
is the proof of their general fitness and common convenience, but still
more by judicial exposition; so that, when in a course of judicial
proceeding... the general rule has been modified, limited and applied,
according to particular cases, such judicial exposition, when well
settled and acquiesced in, becomes itself a precedent, and forms a rule
of law for future cases, under like circumstances. The effect of this
expansive and comprehensive character of the common law is, that
whilst it has its foundations in the principles of equity, natural justice,
and that general convenience which is public policy; although these
general considerations would be too vague and uncertain for practical
purposes, in the various and complicated cases, of daily occurrence, in
the business of an active community; yet the rules of the common law,
so far as cases have arisen and practices actually grown up, are
rendered in a good degree, precise and certain, for practical purposes,
by usage and judicial precedent."'
The great virtue of the common law, Shaw tells us, is that it "consists of
a few broad and comprehensive principles founded on reason, natural
justice, and enlightened public policy."55 These principles form, as it
were, the ethical core of the common law. Examples include the
principle that no one should be able to profit by his own fraud or take
advantage of his own wrong,"6 the prohibition against unjust enrichment,57 and the principle that those with great economic power ought
not to be allowed to take unfair advantage of others.5 " Other examples
are the principle that, as between an innocent party and a wrongdoer,
the wrongdoer should bear the damages; and the principle that, in the
case of two wrongdoers, damages ought to be proportioned according to
wrong. Around a core of such fundamental principles, which have both
moral and legal dimensions, a more or less coherent body of jurisprudence has gradually developed. To put it in terms of Plato's discussion

54. Norwood Plains Co., 1 Gray at 267 (emphasis supplied).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889); John W. Wade, Acquisition of
Property by Willfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 HARV.

L. REV. 715 (1936).

57. The ethical prohibition against unjust enrichment is expressed in the common law
in, among other places, the doctrine of constructive trust. See, e.g., AUSTIN W. SCOTr, THE
LAW OF TRUSTs § 404.2 (2d ed. 1956).
58. See, e.g., Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 U.S. (1 Wall.) 358 (1873).
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in the Gorgias, the principles lie at the heart of a body of jurisprudence
that is constantly striving "in the direction of justice."59
The student of Legal Process would be expected to regard these
fundamental principles as a "precious inheritance and possession"--so
much so, indeed, that even a democratically elected legislature should
not be allowed to depart from them unless it does so thoughtfully and
responsibly and makes its intention to do so unmistakably clear.61 The
following propositions form the core of the Legal Process understanding:
that the law rests upon a body of hard-won and deeply-imbedded
principles and policies-such, precisely, as the principle that one
should not be allowed to profit by his own wrong; that this body of
thought about the problems of social living is a precious inheritance
and possession of the whole society; that the legislature, within broad
constitutional limits, has the right and power to modify or depart from
one or more of these traditional principles and policies if after due
consideration it deems it wise to do so; but that no body of men and
women constituting for the time being merely one session of the
legislature has authority to abandon any part of this inheritance
unthinkingly or without making clear openly and responsibly its
purpose to do so; and that accordingly every statute is to be read as
subject to established principles and policies of the general law save
only as
a decision to modify or depart from them is made unmistakably
62
plain.

Like Jackson at Nuremberg, moreover, the Legal Process materials
embrace the view that the common law has continued to evolve over
time and, furthermore, that the primary process through which it has
done so is through the progressive incorporation by the courts of the
evolving moral customs of the community. That view is given classic
articulation in James Carter's famous lectures on the role of custom in
the development of the law, subsequently published in book form under
the title, Law: Its Origin, Growth and Function.' The core of that
understanding is expressed in the following passage from Carter's book:
The judges are both by appointment and tradition the experts in
ascertaining and declaring the customs of life. As the higher forms of
conduct become customary they pervade all social and business life
.... [The role of the judge is] to recognise and sanction the improving

59. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.

60. HART & SACKS, supra note 41, at 92-93.

61. Id
62. Id.
63. JAMEs C. CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND FUNCTION (Da Capo Press 1974)
(1907) (discussed in HART & SACKS, supra note 41, at 430-35).
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customs of life. Here is the process by which the unwritten private law
recognises the advance in morals and manners and affixes upon
advancing forms of custom the authenticating stamp of public approval
.... In short, it is the function of the judges to watchfully observe the
developing moral thought, and catch the indications of improvement in
customary conduct, and enlarge and refine correspondingly the legal
rules. In this way, step by step, the great fabrics of common law and
equity law have been built up without the aid of legislation and the
process is still going on.C
This notion that the law evolves through judicial transformation of
"developing moral thought" and "improvement in customary conduct"
into enforceable "legal rules" lies at the core not only of the Legal
Process view but also, it will be recalled, the view embraced by Jackson
in his opening statement at Nuremberg. Here once again, we find an
almost perfect correspondence between the two.
One important implication of adopting this view is the recognition that
the law is not, and should never be, bound by mindless adherence to
precedent or stare decisis. The law is always and inescapably in a state
of flux. Earlier precedents are constantly being modified and adjusted
to accommodate doing whatever justice requires under present circumstances.
The student of Legal Process would be expected to bring all of this to
bear in drafting a memorandum for the Ames Supreme Court in the
injured motorcyclist case. The immediate implication should be clear.
Professor Tortson's initial assertion that "[wlith the moral side of the
question courts are not concerned," the student would be expected to say,
is patently and demonstrably false. It runs counter to the most
fundamental understanding of what law is and how it has developed.
That is not to say, however, that the reverse is necessarily true: that
whatever is moral is also legal. Indeed, much of what Tortson goes on
to say after his initial assertion has a certain validity. The student has
to make distinctions here. That is what learning to think like a lawyer
means: It means, as Thomas Reed Powell once remarked, "learning to
think about a thing that is hitched to other things without thinking
about the things that it is hitched to." While there are some kinds of
moral questions with which the law is and ought to be concerned, in
other words, there are others that ought to be left to the conscience.
Thus, when Tortson goes on to claim that only "the omission or negligent
discharge of legal duties ... comes within the sphere of legal cognizance," he is speaking accurately. He is also right when he insists that

64. Id. at 327-31 (quoting JA. DIXON, JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE 312 (1874)).

65. Letter from T. Powell to R. Schuyler, supra note 1.
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there is a whole range of moral behavior and conduct that is not
properly the subject of legal recognition or enforcement: for example,
"failure to respond to the calls of worthy charity" and "faltering in the
bestowment of brotherly love on the unfortunate." The law can and
ought to enforce a legal "duty of care," but it would be venturing beyond
its proper limits if it sought to create and enforce a generalized duty of
caring.6
The challenge is drawing the line between those matters that ought
to be the subject of legal enforcement and those that ought to be left to
the conscience. Should an affirmative obligation to provide relief for the
suffering be established by the courts? Or should withholding relief
from the suffering be treated instead simply as a matter of conscience?
To the student of Legal Process, putting it that way is putting it too
broadly. A more refined approach is called for, based on a wise
understanding of institutional limitations and possibilities. In simplified
terms, that more refined approach would include at least the following
steps:
First, the law has evolved to the point where the judicial establishment of a limited affirmative obligation to aid a stranger in distress is
possible and perhaps appropriate. The establishment of such a limited
duty would not require recognition of a generalized duty of caring, but
could be adopted through marginal extension of the already established
duty of care.
Second, a number of factors make this case a particularly strong one
for extending the common law to include a limited duty of rescue. (1)
The "custom" of the medical community, as reflected in the "Principles
of Medical Ethics," establishes a clear expectation that a physician will
"respond to any request for his assistance in an emergency or whenever
Failure to so act is
temperate public opinion expects the service."
clearly considered a "wrong." Thus Doctor Drake cannot claim that in
refusing to come to Jones' assistance, he did not know that he was acting
in a way that would be considered both by his profession and by
temperate public opinion as wrong. (2) Moreover, the law in Ames has
already evolved to the point where it imposes an affirmative duty "to act
with reasonable care" on those who voluntarily undertake to perform
Good Samaritan activities," It imposes a similar affirmative obligation

66. Cf Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primeron Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL

EDUC. 3 (1988), in which Professor Bender argues for a legal duty to rescue inspired by "a
feminist ethic based upon notions of caring, responsibility, interconnectedness, and
cooperation." Id. at 34.
67. Legal Process Exam, supra note 40, at 39.

68. Id.
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on drivers of vehicles involved in an accident in which others are
injured, regardless of fault."9 These legislatively created requirements,
while not directly relevant, reflect a general societal judgment that
people in a position to help a stranger in distress ought in certain
circumstances to be legally required to do so, even though they may not
have originally been at fault. Creation of a limited affirmative
obligation in this case, in other words, could help bring about a certain
coherence in this emerging body of jurisprudence.
This is one of those moments in the life of the culture, in other words,
where the law stands poised to incorporate into legal standards the
evolving moral sense of the community. Under these circumstances, as
Jackson argued at Nuremberg, those who do what they know is
considered wrong by the community in the hope that the law will be
"laggard" in incorporating the moral sense of the community into legal
standards act at their peril.7"
(3) Before creating a limited affirmative duty to act in such situations,
however, the court should consider arguments for not doing so. Why
might it be unfair to require someone in the position of Doctor Drake to
come to the aid of a stranger in a medical emergency? The major reason
is that it would subject him to potential economic liability or risk of
personal harm. The first of these concerns is disposed of by state
legislation which insulates "a physician or registered nurse" who
"renders emergency care at the scene of an emergency" from liability for
negligence. The only circumstance in which Doctor Drake could be
potentially subject to liability is if he acted in a way that could be
characterized as "gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct."
The second concern, the concern with risk of personal physical injury, is
simply not present under these circumstances. So, in this case, there is
no good reason for not imposing an affirmative duty to act.71
(4) Before recommending such a disposition to the court, however, the
student would be expected to identify parameters of the duty being
created so as to ensure its fair and evenhanded application in the future.
Without attempting to define those parameters exactly for all future
cases, the court could rule that liability would be limited to those cases
where (a) there is a clear emergency, (b) failure to act could result in
serious injury or death, (c) failure to act under the circumstances would
69. Id.
70. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
71. Legal Process Exam, supra note 40, at 39. There is also a possible reliance
argument under these circumstances, since Doctor Drake purported to be relying on the
law as it was described in Tortson's lecture. I do not think the reliance argument is
terribly strong here, but if it were, then the Court should consider prospective application
of the new rule.
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be considered by temperate public opinion to be wrong, and (d) there was
no significant risk to the defendant of either personal physical injury or
economic harm.
So bounded, the court's decision could be reconciled with its earlier
decision that an expert swimmer did not have an affirmative duty to
rescue a drowning child, since, even for an expert swimmer, such a
rescue effort might pose a risk of injury or death. Having gone through
an analysis along these lines, the student would then be in a position to
recommend that the Court reverse the lower court and remand for a trial
consistent with the principles announced above.

Though crudely done, this analysis reflects in rough terms at least the
traditional understanding of what it means to learn to think like a
lawyer. The key thing to notice, for present purposes, is how similar the
view of law reflected here is to that expressed by Justice Jackson at
Nuremberg. In both cases, the basic understanding is that the law
consists at its core of fundamental principles. In both cases, the primary
way in which the law grows is through progressive incorporation into
legally enforceable standards of the evolving moral sense of the
community. In both cases, there is clear rejection of the view that law
and morality are radically separate.
If the Legal Process view were not fairly reflective of the traditional
view, it would be one thing. But one cannot find any more classic
expression of the traditional view than in the Legal Process materials.
Moreover, it is difficult to think of any other single overview course to
which, over the years, a greater number of law students have been
subjected. If there is any course or set of materials that can be fairly
said to express what it means to think like a lawyer in the traditional
understanding, this is it.
IV.
But if mainstream legal education does not teach that law and
morality must be kept radically separate, indeed, if it teaches, and
always has taught, just the opposite, why then do law students so
consistently feel as if they are being asked to make that sort of
separation? Why do they feel as if, as a cost of acquiring a legal
education, they are being asked to deny important aspects of their
selves?
I am not sure I know the answers to these questions, but I do know
that the feelings themselves are real and widely shared. My own view
is that the contributing factors are probably much more subtle and
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complex than those who complain about the dehumanizing impact of law
school education are generally prepared to recognize. And one crucial
factor that is often overlooked, it seems to me, if the problem is not the
education itself, is what the students bring to it.
The core of the problem, in my view, is the "sentimental fallacy." The
sentimental fallacy is the notion that in undertaking any kind of
technical education, one loses one's capacity for responding to experience
in human terms. Thus we all nod knowingly when we hear the story of
the student who, before coming to law school, looked out the window and
saw a meadow filled with flowers, but, after having undergone a legal
education, looked out the same window at the same meadow and could
see only restrictive covenants running up and down. We nod knowingly
because somewhere along the way we have been taken in by the myth
that one cannot acquire a technical education without losing one's basic
humanity.
The sentimental fallacy is a deeply persistent one in our culture. One
finds it expressed not only in the context of a legal education but in
connection with almost any kind of technical or professional education.
The following passage from Mark Twain's Life on the Mississippi, in
which Twain describes what happened to him as he learned to become
a riverboat pilot, is a classic example:
The face of the water, in time, became a wonderful book-a book
that was a dead language to the uneducated passenger.... Throughout the long twelve hundred miles there was never a page that was
void of interest .... The passenger who could not read it was charmed
with a peculiar sort of faint dimple on its surface... ; but to the pilot
that was an italicizedpassage; indeed, it was more than that, it was a
legend of the largest capitals, with a string of shouting exclamation
points at the end of it; for it meant that a wreck or a rock was buried
there that could tear the life out of the strongest vessel that ever
floated. It is the faintest and simplest expression the water ever
makes, and the most hideous to a pilot's eye. In truth, the passenger
who could not read this book saw nothing but all manner of pretty
pictures in it, painted by the sun and shaded by the clouds, whereas to
the trained eye these were not pictures at all, but the grimmest and
most dead earnest of reading matter.
Now when I had mastered the language of this water, and had come
to know every trifling feature that bordered the great river as
familiarly as I knew the letters of the alphabet, I had made a valuable
acquisition. But I had lost something, too. I had lost something which
could never be restored to me while I lived. All the grace, the beauty,
the poetry had gone out of the majestic river! I still keep in mind a
certain wonderful sunset which I witnessed when steamboating was
new to me. A broad expanse of the river was turned to blood; in the
middle distance the red hue brightened into gold, through which a
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solitary log came floating, black and conspicuous; in one place a long,
slanting mark lay sparkling upon the water; in another the surface was
broken by boiling, tumbling rings, that were as many-tinted as an opal;
where the ruddy flush was faintest, was a smooth spot that was
covered with graceful circles and radiating lines, ever so delicately
traced; the shore on our left was densely wooded, and the somber
shadow that fell from this forest was broken in one place by a long,
rufied trail that shone like silver ....
I stood like one bewitched. I drank it in, in a speechless rapture.
The world was new to me, and I had never seen anything like this at
home. But as I have said, a day came when I began to cease from
noting the glories and the charms which the moon and the sun and the
twilight wrought upon the river's face; another day came when I ceased
altogether to note them. Then, if that sunset scene had been repeated,
I should have looked upon it without rapture, and should have
commented upon it, inwardly, after this fashion: "This sun means that
we are going to have wind tomorrow; that floating log means that the
river is rising, small thanks to it; that slanting mark on the water
refers to a bluff reef which is going to kill somebody's steamboat one of
these nights ... ; those tumbling 'boils' show a dissolving bar and a
changing channel there; the lines and circles in the slick water over
yonder are a warning that that troublesome place is shoaling up
dangerously; that silver streak in the shadow of the forest is the 'break'
from a new snag .... "
No, the romance and the beauty were all gone from the river. All
the value any feature of it had for me now was the amount of
usefulness it could furnish toward compassing the safe piloting of a
steamboat.72

Anyone who has ever undergone a legal education-or any other kind of
professional education, for that matter-has probably felt this way, or
something close to it, at one time or another. As one learns to master
the "river" from a technical point of view, "the romance and the beauty"
seem to go out of it.
The feeling is there, but how valid is it? In the first place, there is
something a little phony, is there not, about the claim that Twain makes
here. He claims that he has lost his capacity for responding to
experience in poetic terms, but who is it that is doing all this nice poetic
writing?. The answer is: the Twain who had already become the pilot.
The passage itself is testimony, in other words, to the fact that Twain
had not entirely lost his capacity for thinking and talking about the
world in poetic terms.

72.

MARK TWAIN, LIFE ON THE MISSISSIPPI 67-69 (Reader's Digest ed. 1987) (1883).
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The deeper problem has to do with the quality of the poetic vision
itself. As a crude foil for the subsequently described technical view, the
"pretty picture" that Twain paints performs its duty. But standing on
its own, there is really nothing very vital or interesting about it. It is
simply a "pretty picture," clichd-ridden and syrupy. Commenting on this
passage, Professor James White asks tellingly: "What has Twain really
lost: the poet's view ...

or the sentimentalist's?

Can this passage be

read as the story of growing out of a childish way of thinking and
talking?"73 Merely to ask this question is to draw attention to shortcomings of the sensibility and voice that Twain presumably lost in the
course of becoming a riverboat pilot. As White asks, how much is really
lost in losing this way of thinking and talking?
It should not surprise us then to find that law students feel about
their education much the same way that Twain felt about his. That is
not to say that students do not bring to law school a great deal of
experience and understanding that is truly valuable, because they do,
and it would be a shame if their legal education forced them to abandon
that. But it is also true that, like the youthful Twain, they also often
bring a highly sentimental view of the world and the way it works. The
reason they feel the way they do about their legal education is that legal
education is not terribly welcoming to sentimentalism in any form. It
constantly insists that we make hard, critical judgments-something
that is anathema to the sentimental imagination. So part of the
resistance to a legal education, surely, is simply a resistance to giving
up one's former sentimental ways of thinking and talking about
experience.
That resistance is often framed in terms of head versus heart. 4 But
the dichotomy itself, it should be apparent, is a false one. The aim of
law school is not to replace the heart with the head, or to deny in any
other way the instincts of the heart, but simply rather, to borrow from
Hooker, to teach the heart how to think.7 5 It is to transform the
sentimental imagination into a critical one.
Part of the problem is that, notwithstanding everything that has been
said so far, legal education does require a kind of separation of law from
morality, of the personal from the professional self, and some students

73.

JAMEs B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 12 (1973).

74. Typical is the comment of one of the law students quoted in Elkins' paper: "Most
law professors look askance at a student who relies on his heart rather than his head,"

Elkins, supra note 15, at 527.
'75. "[M]y whole endeavor is to resolve the conscience, and to shew as near as I can
what in this controversy the heart is to think, if it will follow the light of sound and sincere
judgment, without either cloud of prejudice, or mist of passionate affection.," RICHARD
HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF ECcLESIASTiAL POLITY 122 (Everyman's Library 1969).
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feel deeply uncomfortable with having to make that kind of separation.
I am talking about the kind of separation that is required by the Legal
Process examination considered above: about the difficulty and
importance of drawing a line between those kinds of moral conduct that
the law can effectively transform into legal enforceable duties and those
kinds that are best left to matters of conscience. It is not that moral
considerations falling on one side of the line are relevant and those
falling on the other are not. The need for drawing the line arises,
rather, from the recognition that there are limitations to what the law
can do. If we were to try to create, as some feminists have suggested,76
a legally enforceable duty of "caring," a duty that incorporated all those
aspects of moral behavior that Professor Tortson would relegate to
matters of conscience, there are serious questions whether the law could
handle the problems that would arise. It is not just that the law is not
well equipped to deal with problems arising from failure to live up to
certain kinds of moral expectations, it is that the world in which we live
is probably a better place by virtue of the fact that we leave a wide
range of moral conduct to matters of conscience. Knowing the difference
between what kinds of moral conduct can be effectively incorporated into
legally enforceable standards, and what kinds cannot, requires a
sophisticated understanding of institutional possibilities and limitations.
That is why developing an understanding of those possibilities and
limitations forms the core of a traditional legal education.
In acquiring such an education, students are often required to make
unaccustomed distinctions and separations. They have to learn how to
think about things that are hitched to other things without thinking
about the other things they are hitched to, and that leaves them
sometimes deeply perplexed and uncomfortable. When they are asked
to deny (as they see it) some aspects of their moral response to
experience, they do not know how to respond, so they respond by making
the exaggerated claim that law requires radical separation of law and
morality-which, as we have seen, is not true. They take a difficulty
and elevate it into an impossibility; they take a partial truth and
transform it into an absolute one. The surest indication that we are in
the presence of a sentimental imagination is when we see this pattern
at work.
It is important to recognize that law students are not alone in this
regard. Law professors-Elkins' "Professor Lawson," to name one-also
sometimes have trouble making these sorts of distinctions and end up
as a consequence reinforcing the same radical but inaccurate view.

76. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 66.
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Another factor that contributes to the unease students feel with their
legal education, I think, is the widespread misunderstanding and misuse
of the Socratic method. This is an enormous subject and I can touch
upon it only briefly and inadequately here. I happen to think that the
Socratic method is an extremely valuable pedagogical tool. When used
properly, there is no better method for training the critical judgment.
I realize, however, that there is another view. In Zen and the Art of
Motorcycle Maintenance, Pirsig portrays the Socratic method as the
weapon of the dissecting intelligence. Dialectic, as he views it, is the
antithesis of rhetoric. According to him, the Sophists employed rhetoric
to tell stories through which they communicated the "wholeness" of life.
Then along came Plato with his dialectic, which he proceeded to deploy
in a way calculated to deplace rhetoric and destroy the Sophists' view of
life. This was the great cultural event that issued in a destructive
fragmentation of consciousness. Dialectic, as Pirsig views it, is employed
to tear things apart; rhetoric, to put things together. Elkins appears to
share, if not entirely, at least part of, this view.
But I think that if you read the Gorgias thoughtfully and carefully,
you will see that that is not at all what dialectic meant to Plato. The
great advantage of dialectic over rhetoric, in Plato's view, is that it
depends for its effective operation upon the existence of a relationship
of mutual trust and respect between the parties engaging in it. Not only
is every point that one makes open to criticism by the other, the form
itself invites such criticism. Dialectic proceeds from the belief that out
of a process of thoughtful, focused, self-critical discussion a much better
understanding of whatever it is that is being considered will arise.
Unlike rhetoric, it does not lend itself to manipulation of one's audience.
Also unlike rhetoric, it is unsparingly critical of sloppy, unfocused-"fuzzy"-thinking in whatever form.
I think the sentimentalist's hostility to dialectic lies precisely here:
that it is unsparingly critical of fuzzy thinking. But to the genuinely
poetic imagination, dialectic offers nothing to fear. As Plato's performance in the Gorgias demonstrates, as does Jackson's performance at
Nuremberg, there is no inherent inconsistency between being thoughtful,
focused, and self-critical on the one hand, and being poetic and caring
and human on the other. Making connections between the imagination
and the critical judgment, between the heart and the head, between
feeling and thinking, may not always be easy, but that is not to say that
such connections cannot be made.
So the problem in the final analysis is not losing one's poetic capacity,
but finding ways to make connections between what one knows specially
as a lawyer and everything else that one knows. This brings us, I think,
to the core problem: It is not that the connections cannot be made, it is
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that they are not always easy to make.77 Indeed, there often exists a
tension between how we see the world as lawyers and how we see it in
our other capacities, which means that making connections- certainly,
making them in a fresh and original way-often requires a considerable
art.
The starting point of any intelligent effort to come to terms with a
legal education, it seems to me, is to recognize that there are tensions
between the way we see the world as lawyers and the various other
ways we see it. The existence of these tensions need not be viewed as
a bad thing, however. Indeed, just the opposite. In a very real sense,
the life of the mind in the law is composed of these tensions and the
creative pressures they exert.78

The situation of the lawyer is not all that different in this respect, I
would argue, from that of one who has grown up in this country as an
African-American. Both are in the position of having to look at the
seemingly incompatworld from two different-sometimes
is
having to look at the
lawyer,
it
ible-perspectives at once. For the
world through the specialized lens of the lawyer while at the same time
not abandoning the human perspective. For the African-American, it
means looking at the world from the special perspective of one who is
black without abandoning also the shared human perspective.
The writer, Ralph Ellison, once had to wrestle with this problem.
Accused by Irving Howe of not being a genuine "Negro writer" because
he did not write about experience the way that Richard Wright did in
Black Boy, 79 Ellison responded that, while he recognized the uniqueness
of black culture and the impact that it had on him, he had not learned
to write from Richard Wright. He had learned from writers like
Hemingway and Faulkner and Melville and Hawthorne-from writers
in the mainstream of the American literary tradition-and he saw the
world through their eyes as much as through any other. He resented
being pigeonholed as a "Negro writer," even more being told that he was

77. On this point, Elkins and I would probably agree. The chief difference between us
is that Elkins seems to regard the existence of difficulties and tensions in a legal education
as evidence of a defect of legal education, whereas I view these same difficulties and
tensions as a central source of the life of the mind in the law.
78. For a highly original treatment of these tensions and the creative possibilities they
represent, see WHITE, supra note 73. Among traditional jurisprudential writers, Lon Fuller
and Alexander Bickel stand out as among the most creative in working the tensions that
constitute the life of the mind in the law. On Fuller, see Teachout, The Soul of the Fugue:
An Essay on Reading Fuller, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1073 (1986). On Bickel, see Kronman,
Alexander Bickel's Philosophyof Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985).
79. Ellison describes his dispute with Howe in "The World and the Jug," in RALPH
ELLIsoN, SHADow AND ACT 115 (1966).
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not an "authentic" one. He was a Negro and he saw the world through
a Negro's eyes, there was no escaping that, and he would not want to if
he could, but he was also a writer and he saw the world through the
eyes of an American writer as well. The whole challenge, then, was
finding a way to bring these two perspectives together.
In a classically beautiful passage, Ellison described what it meant to
be both a "Negro" and an "American writer" in the following terms:
It imposes the uneasy burden and occasional joy of a complex double
vision, a fluid, ambivalent response to men and events which represents, at its finest, a profoundly civilized adjustment to the cost of
being human in this modem world.'
"It imposes the uneasy burden and occasional joy of a complex double
vision .... " If I had to find a single phrase that captures what it means
to learn to "think like a lawyer"-as epitomized by Jackson's performance at Nuremberg, as embodied in the Legal Process materials, and
as it really is-that would be it.

80. Id. at 137.

Appendix A

Legal Process Question II from Final Examinations at
Harvard Law School, Fall Term, 1967-68
Professors Hart and Sacks
In 1967, D, a doctor specializing in brain surgery, accompanied his
neighbor T, a Torts professor, to a public meeting at which T gave a
lecture on the subject: "Some Public Misconceptions About Law." In the
course of his lecture, T made reference to the common law's refusal to
impose an affirmative obligation to aid a stranger in distress. Of this he
said the following:
"With the humane side of the question courts are not concerned.
It is the omission or negligent discharge of legal duties only which
comes within the sphere of legal cognizance. For withholding relief
from the suffering, for failure to respond to the calls of worthy charity,
or for faltering in the bestowment of brotherly love on the unfortunate,
penalties are found not in the laws of men but in that higher law, the
violation of which is condemned by the voice of conscience, whose
sentence of punishment for the recreant act is swift and sure."
While walking home from the meeting, D and T saw a motorcycle
driven by P skid on an ice patch and collide with a tree. They found P
lying unconscious on the side of the road, bleeding profusely from a deep
gash in his thigh. To Ts urging that D "do something to stop the
bleeding," D replied that he did not wish to get involved. T immediately
telephoned the police from a nearby public phone and requested that an
ambulance be sent. Because of hazardous highway conditions caused by
snow and ice, it took thirty minutes for aid to arrive. P died of loss of
blood on the way to the hospital.
Subsequently P's administrator filed a wrongful death action against
D in an Ames state court, alleging that D was under a legal duty as a
doctor to provide emergency care, and that if D had fashioned and
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applied a tourniquet to P's wound, as he easily could have, the bleeding
would have been checked and P would have survived.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action, and P's administrator has appealed to the Supreme Court of
Ames. Counsel for the litigants have presented the following material:
(1) Numerous decisions of the state supreme court in accord with the
assertion of the Torts professor that there is no duty to come to the aid
of a stranger. In a recent application of this principle, the court
absolved an expert swimmer of any liability by reason of his failure to
attempt the rescue of a drowning child.
(2) Decisions to the effect that one who undertakes, whether by
request or officiously, to assist a person in peril must act with reasonable care and prudence and cannot abandon his efforts if to do so would
expose the injured or endangered person to further risk of harm.
(3) Decisions allowing recovery in quantum meruit for necessary
medical services furnished in an emergency, even where the patient did
not specifically request or agree to pay for the services.
(4) A so-called "Good Samaritan" statute of a common type, enacted
by the state legislature in 1966, which provides:
"A physician or registered nurse who in good faith renders
emergency care at the scene of an emergency, where a physicianpatient or registered nurse-patient relationship did not exist prior to
the advent of such emergency, shall not be liable for any civil damages
as a result of acts or omissions by the physician or registered nurse in
rendering the emergency care, except acts or omissions amounting to
gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct."
(5) A provision in the Principles of Medical Ethics promulgated by the
American Medical Association (a voluntary professional organization,
membership in which is not a prerequisite for the practice of medicine):
"A physician is free to choose whom he will serve. He should,
however, respond to any request for his assistance in an emergency or
whenever temperate public opinion expects the service ** *."
(6) A penal provision in the state's Motor Vehicle Code which requires
the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident to "render to any person
injured in such accident reasonable assistance in securing medical aid
or transportation."
(7) The state's medical licensing statute which authorizes suspension
or revocation of a doctor's license for "professional misconduct." The
latter phrase is defined in the act as meaning certain enumerated
things, such as criminal abortions, improper advertising, fee-splitting,
and so forth; but the statute makes no reference to refusal of services.
State what the decision of the Supreme Court of Ames should be,
canvassing all issues.

